From 2020, Emmanuel Macron proposed a reflection on the European dimension of French nuclear deterrence. In this sense, he proposed a strategic dialogue as well as joint nuclear exercises between European partners. Five years later, in February 2025, Friedrich Merz, future federal chancellor, responded to this call, advocating an extension of the French nuclear umbrella to Germany while the United States of Donald Trump no longer appeared as a reliable partner to protect Europe.
But does France have the ability to defend Europe? Would the hypothetical deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make it possible to concretize the strategic autonomy of Europe, giving it the means to defend itself independently?
French nuclear deterrence in the face of the Russian threat
Originally, France developed its atomic armament to respond to the threat of Soviet invasion and to avoid dependence on the United States. According to a stable doctrine and regularly reaffirmed by political power, Paris would use its strategic arsenal by air and submarine in the event of an attack on its vital interests.
The fact remains that, without the American support, the balance of power appears largely unfavorable to France, which has 290 nuclear heads against 1,600 heads deployed (4,380 heads with stocks) on the Russian side.
Admittedly, the explosive power of thermonuclear warheads, combined with the ballistic scope of the Mer-Solistic French M51 M51 missile M51, would make it possible to vitrify the main Russian cities, including Moscow.
But conversely, it would be enough for Russians of “200 seconds to atomize Paris”, according to an estimate given on Russian television about the Satan thermonuclear missiles.
This classic communication operation refers to the so -called “drip” perspective consisting in destroying enemy cities in an atomic exchange at the time, in which Russia can count on its immensity to gain wear. It is this potential reciprocal vitrification that must be kept in mind in the mutual bet of nuclear deterrence.
In order to boost the impact of French nuclear deterrence, a partnership could be envisaged with the United Kingdom. Nuclear power since 1952, London has only had ballistic missiles launched by submarine and has decided, from Brexit, to strengthen its arsenal at 260 nuclear heads. But, although sharing common interests, these two European nuclear powers are not equivalent.
Unlike the United Kingdom, which is a member of the NATO nuclear plans group and whose warheads are designed in the United States, France produces its weapons on its own territory and is not subject to any NATO obligation, which gives Paris a major room for maneuver to define its doctrine. Finally, France remains legitimate to speak on behalf of the European Union, of which it has been a politically part since its creation.
French nuclear force: an alternative to the extended deterrent in the United States
France officially became an atomic power in 1960 by relying on its own resources, the external support of the United States oscillating according to events. Because the appearance of an independent French strategic force has long upset Washington which sought to restrict it by international treaties-such as the 1963 Treaty limiting atmospheric nuclear tests or the Treaty of Non-Proliferation (TNP) in 1968. Since 1974, officially, French nuclear force has a clean dissuasive role within NATO, contributing to overall security the alliance by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.
Almost sixty years ago, the establishment of the response graduated by President Lyndon Johnson had strengthened doubts about the determination of the White House to fully engage in the defense of Europe. Today, President Trump's desire to end his country's support to Ukraine confirms these suspicions. Consequently, increasingly manifest and insistent voices argue for the acceptance of a French nuclear force which would no longer be chemically pure, but which would extend on a European scale.
The pre-positioning of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe
The request of the future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz joins the French proposal to establish a dialogue engaging Europeans in a common approach. As the Minister of the Armed Forces recalled, the precise definition of vital interest is the sole responsibility of the President of the French Republic according to the circumstances. However, the use of nuclear weapons to protect Europe implies a strategic discussion to define the power to be acquired, the interests to be defended and the mode of command of nuclear fire.
Advocating towards the framework of a Europeanization of nuclear force means increasing the capacities of deterrence and, therefore, increasing the French arsenal to enable it to respond to threats which concern all 27 member states of the European Union. This requires constituting additional stocks of fissile materials and therefore reactivating the production factories of Pierrelatte (Drôme) and Marcoule (Gard) dismantled in 1998, sacrificed on the altar of unilateral disarmament.
The dogma of strict sufficiency must also be questioned. If today, 290 nuclear heads represent the value that France gives to defend it from its existence, this price seems to neglect the scale of the European continent, and logic confirms it: the nuclear powers of continental size such as the United States, Russia and soon China deploy an Arsenal up to a thousand thermonuclear heads.
The rise in power will take time and require a budgetary effort for its European extension through the increase in the number of missiles and load -bearing planes. In addition to the construction of new infrastructure in European partner countries, the cost could exceed 10 billion euros annually, not to mention the indirect costs linked to maintenance and logistics. A long time to take into account, especially as the political and strategic supply of extended nuclear protection evolves according to the circumstances.
While Berlin has so far preferred France to assume a role simply complementary to the extended deterrent in the United States, the abandonment of Ukraine by the latter gives a bonus to the Russian aggressor. As Emmanuel Macron indicates, France could in reaction propose a prepositioning of its nuclear forces in Eastern European countries with the idea of replacing the United States.
This French nuclear umbrella would concretize European strategic autonomy through the deployment of nuclear capacity combat aircraft, a sign of European political solidarity and making Moscow calculations more difficult.
The visible presence of these planes in Eastern Europe could prevent Russia from attacking the countries in question with conventional means, such an attack risking causing a French nuclear response in the name of Europe.
